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Since the late 1980s, the concept of precaution has been incorporated into numerous
international agreements and laws, as well as in domestic statutes and policies in many
countries. This paper examines the international emergence of the concept and its
application in Australia. Despite rapid growth in adoption of the so-called ‘precau-
tionary principle’, the concept remains highly controversial, and its success in terms of
improving environmental and natural resource management has been questioned. A
common misconception is that the principle prescribes action. In fact, internationally
accepted deﬁnitions are about decision-making processes. This paper argues that
implementation guidelines are essential to ensure that precautionary decision-making









Since the late 1980s, the precautionary principle – in one of its many guises –
has been incorporated into numerous international agreements and laws, as well
as in domestic statutes and policies in many countries, including Australia.
Despite rapid growth in its adoption, the principle remains controversial, and
its success in terms of improving environmental and natural resource man-
agement, and of promoting sustainable development, has been questioned.
Increasing awareness of serious environmental degradation and damage to
human health – in some cases, many years after potential hazards were ﬁrst
identiﬁed – prompted pressures for anticipatory action. The precautionary
principle was conceived as a means to ensure that decision-makers would
take into account uncertain but potentially serious and/or irreversible threats
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of harm. Prior to its introduction, pollution controls had been rejected due
to absence of deﬁnitive proof of environmental damage.
The principle originated in Europe in the early 1970s, but it was not until
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development that
it achieved broad international recognition (LaFranchi 2005). The principle
was included in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
as part of the broader framework for sustainable development. It was further
promulgated in the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
and the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity. The precautionary
principle has, since then, spread rapidly in multilateral agreements, interna-
tional laws, and domestic laws and policies.
In practice, the precautionary principle has proven difﬁcult to apply, due
largely to the absence of a clear formulation of the principle, and a lack of
clear guidelines on when and how to apply it. This has created difﬁculties for
public decision-makers, uncertainty for business, opportunities for legal chal-
lenges to environmental policies and regulatory decisions, and the potential
for its misuse as a barrier to trade.
This paper begins by examining key formulations of the principle. A clas-
siﬁcation system is described and applied and the signiﬁcance of differences
between various formulations is highlighted. Frequently raised concerns are
then discussed. Australian deﬁnitions of the principle and key legal decisions
on its application are considered next. A number of the implementation problems
experienced in Australia result from the absence of ofﬁcial guidelines to assist
decision-makers. An assessment of a number of overseas guidelines concludes
the paper. These may provide a useful starting point for developing Australian
guidelines for managing uncertainty in signiﬁcant environmental problems.
 
2. The meaning of precaution
 
There is no universally accepted deﬁnition of the principle. Although most
share common features, the differences between the various formulations
complicate the task of interpreting what the principle means and how it
should be applied. In this section, a classiﬁcation system proposed by Cooney
(2005) is discussed, and the range of potential precautionary actions is noted.
Finally, the question of whether the concept of precaution constitutes a
principle or an approach is canvassed.
The most widely cited deﬁnition of the principle is that contained in the
Rio Declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientiﬁc certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation. (Principle 15, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development 1992) 
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However, there are many alternative deﬁnitions and interpretations that
complicate the principle’s application. The main differences are:
•W hat level (threshold) of threat or potential for harm is sufﬁcient to trigger
application of the principle?
•A re  the potential threats balanced against other considerations, such as
costs or non-economic factors, in deciding what precautionary measures to
implement?
• Does the principle impose a positive obligation to act or simply permit action?
•W here does the burden of proof rest to show the existence or absence of
risk of harm?
• Is liability for environmental harm assigned and, if so, who bears liability?
Based on these differences, Cooney (2005) suggests categorising the different
versions of the principle as ‘weak’, ‘moderate’, or ‘strong’ (adapted from
Wiener 2002).
Most of the inﬂuential international deﬁnitions of the principle, such as
those contained in the Rio Declaration and other UN agreements, fall into the
weak (or least restrictive) category. A key characteristic of the weak formula-
tion is that ‘lack of scientiﬁc certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing action’. Weak formulations act as a ‘rebuttal to the mistaken claim
that uncertainty warrants inaction’ (Wiener 2002, p. 1520). However, this
form does not require action to prevent environmental damage, even if the
threshold of threat has been satisﬁed.
Under the weak form, the precautionary principle comes into play when
threats of harm are ‘serious’, ‘irreversible’, or ‘signiﬁcant’. To satisfy the
threshold of threat, there must be some evidence relating to both likelihood
of occurrence and severity of consequences. Scientiﬁc uncertainty alone, or
the possibility of environmental damage below the threshold level, will not
satisfy the threshold test.
Many, but not all, weak formulations are qualiﬁed by an explicit require-
ment to consider the costs of precautionary measures. For example, both the
Rio Declaration and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
require precautionary measures to be ‘cost-effective’. Cost-effectiveness
means achieving the stated objective using the minimum level of inputs, and
is often used as an alternative to cost–beneﬁt analysis for cases where beneﬁts
can be identiﬁed but are difﬁcult to value. A cost-effectiveness study cannot
by itself demonstrate a conclusive case for or against the appropriateness of




 a weighing up of beneﬁts
against costs. Economic considerations (among others) may provide legitimate
grounds for postponing action, even though lack of scientiﬁc certainty may
not.
Under weak formulations, the requirement to justify the need for action
(the burden of proof) generally falls on those advocating precautionary action.
No mention is made of assignment of liability for environmental harm. 
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In moderate versions, the threat of environmental damage justiﬁes or requires
action to address the threat. An example is the Ministerial Declaration of the
Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea:
The participants . . . will continue to apply the precautionary principle,
that is to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances
that are persistent, toxic, and liable to bioaccumulate even where there
is no scientiﬁc evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and
effects. (Ministerial Declaration 1990)
In practice, such formulations might not be as different from weak versions
as they may ﬁrst appear, because precautionary measures include ‘wait and
see’ approaches (see below). However, the language is suggestive of stronger
forms of action. In addition, there are usually no explicit qualiﬁcations
requiring proposed precautionary measures to be assessed against factors
such as economic or social costs. The trigger for action may be deﬁned less
rigorously, for example, as ‘potential damage’, rather than ‘serious or irre-
versible’ damage as in the weak version. Liability is not mentioned, and the
burden of proof remains unchanged.
Strong versions of the principle differ signiﬁcantly from the weak and
moderate versions in reversing the burden of proof. An example is the 1998
Wingspread Statement:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environ-
ment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and
effect relationships are not fully established scientiﬁcally. In this context
the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden
of proof. (Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle 1998)
Like moderate formulations, strong versions justify or require precautionary
measures. The threshold for action varies, sometimes expressed simply as
‘harm’. Some strong versions, for example, that of Earth Charter, establish
liability for environmental harm:
Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection and,
when knowledge is limited, apply a precautionary approach. . . . Place
the burden of proof on those who argue that a proposed activity will
not cause signiﬁcant harm, and make the responsible parties liable for
environmental harm. (Article 6, Earth Charter 2000)
Under the reversal of proof, proponents of an activity with any potential
for harm are required to prove that the product, process or technology is
sufﬁciently ‘safe’. Virtually no human actions are risk free, including actions
designed to address environmental degradation. Inherent scientiﬁc uncertainty,
which the precautionary principle is designed to address, thwarts attempts to 
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deﬁnitively prove safety, even for products and processes for which no plau-
sible hazards have been identiﬁed. At the extreme, such a requirement could
‘involve bans and prohibitions on entire classes of potentially threatening
activities or substances, without the option for proponents or others to demon-
strate that they are harmless’ (Cooney 2005, p. 7). However, the standard of
proof, such as ‘reasonable certainty’ of safety or safety ‘on the balance of
probabilities’, can moderate the potential negative economic and social
impacts from reversing the burden of proof.
Ofﬁcial statements of the precautionary principle do not generally fall within
the strong category. Most strong versions are framed by private organisa-
tions. As such, they have no international or domestic legal status – yet they
are frequently cited by critics of the principle. Earth Charter, for example, is
a community-based environmental organisation, and the Wingspread State-
ment emerged from a conference of 32 scientists, academics, and environ-
mental activists.
The particular formulation of the precautionary principle applied by decision-
makers will be a major factor determining the economic consequences of
precautionary measures (discussed in section 3).
Much opposition to the application of the precautionary principle derives
from a belief that it requires the prohibition of activities associated with
uncertain, but potentially serious, environmental damage. Yet no formulation
of the principle speciﬁes the nature of any precautionary measures that must
be taken. There are many ways to approach and implement precaution (see,
for example, CEC 2003).
Examples of possible precautionary measures include a ‘wait and see
approach’ where the issue is reviewed when better information becomes avail-
able; adoption of ﬂexible policies that can be adapted in response to new
information; and prohibition (either temporary or permanent). Options may
be combined; for example, an action might be temporarily prohibited while
research of alternative options is undertaken. The appropriate course of
action will depend on the circumstances, which include:
1. The extent and signiﬁcance of the information gaps and uncertainties, and
the prospects and costs and beneﬁts of obtaining better information.
2. The seriousness of possible hazards, including the possibility of catastrophic
events, and society’s degree of risk aversion.
3. The incidence of damage; for example, whether those likely to be most seri-
ously affected are children (where larger safety factors are often applied),
whether adverse effects are concentrated on future generations, or whether
environmental impacts will have large ﬂow-on effects through ecological
systems.
4. The capacity and costs of altering policies in the future, which may depend
on whether policy measures would require, or generate incentives for, long-
lived investments.
5. The potential costs and beneﬁts to society of each alternative action. 
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There has been considerable debate over whether the various expressions
of the concept of precaution are appropriately described as a ‘principle’ or as
an ‘approach’. A dictionary deﬁnition of a principle is ‘a fundamental truth
or law as the basis for reasoning or action’ (Moore 2004). Opponents to the
label ‘principle’ consider that the concept falls well short of this standard. Some
suggest that the use of the term ‘principle’ dictates a ‘hard line’ approach
involving mandatory risk-averse action whenever there are potential threats to
the environment or to human health, and regardless of any balancing of costs
and beneﬁts (Graham 2004; Cooney 2005). A precautionary ‘approach’ is argued
to allow for ﬂexible context-speciﬁc measures, a balancing of various objectives,
and a weighing of expected costs and beneﬁts (OIRA 2003; Cooney 2005).
There is also debate over the legal status of the term ‘precautionary principle’.
Despite broad application of the precautionary principle in international
law and policies, and its prominent role in several trade disputes, the OECD
notes that none of the international tribunals that have dealt with cases
involving the principle has ‘clariﬁed the legal status of precaution, nor con-
ﬁrmed the existence of a precautionary principle as a principle of inter-
national law’ (OECD 2002, p. 13). Considerable conﬂict remains between the
EU view of the principle as a ‘general customary rule of international law’ and
the US view that the principle is no more than ‘an “approach” – the content
of which may vary from context to context’ (WTO Appellate Body Report,
quoted in Sindico 2005, pp. 27–28).
Despite questions over the legal standing of the precautionary principle,
and debate over its status as a ‘principle’, it is clear that precaution is widely
applied in decision-making concerning environmental and natural resource
management. Widespread application indicates that, regardless of whether it
is described as a principle or as an approach, precaution is used by many
decision-makers responding to uncertainty.
The most important factor inﬂuencing outcomes is how precaution is actually
implemented in decision-making. Clear implementation guidelines may poten-
tially resolve many of the underlying difﬁculties perceived to arise from the
use of the term ‘principle’ in the context of precautionary decision-making.
For the purposes of this paper, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
 
3. Concerns related to the precautionary principle
 
Critics have identiﬁed potential problems with application of the precaution-
ary principle, including environmental harm and the imposition of signiﬁcant
costs on society. The likelihood of these problems depends on the principle’s
formulation and implementation. Careful deﬁnition and good design of
implementation guidelines may help avoid many of these problems. The most
frequent criticisms are considered below.
Some commentators note that the deﬁnitional problems involved in imple-
menting the principle are likely to confer a high degree of discretion on decision-
makers (Wills 1997; PC 2004). Excessive discretion may lead to unpredictable 
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and inconsistent environmental management decisions, which create uncer-
tainty and higher costs for businesses (Wills 1997; Harding and Fisher 1999).
A lack of clarity in how decisions have been made opens up opportunities
for legal challenge, and the potential for courts to adopt an interpretation of the
precautionary principle at odds with that intended by the policy maker. As Segal
observes: ‘To leave the entire application of the principle to judicial discretion
does not provide industry with sufﬁcient guidance or certainty’ (Segal 1999,
p. 77). Some urgency attaches therefore to the development of guidelines that
place the precautionary principle within a framework of good regulatory practice.
Some critics oppose the precautionary principle on the grounds that a
reversal in the burden of proof imposes excessive costs on developers and
producers. Most regulatory regimes, such as development approvals and
licensing systems, require developers and producers to provide, at their own
expense, evidence about the proposed activity and its consequences. It is not
clear, except perhaps under some strong versions of the principle, that a
reversal in the burden of proof under the precautionary principle would be
signiﬁcantly more onerous than existing obligations. A more important
factor inﬂuencing the costs of proposals may be the standard of proof. Further,
assignment of the burden of proof does not necessarily dictate who will pay
the costs of scientiﬁc assessment of safety.
Concerns have also been expressed that application of the precautionary
principle may distort regulatory priorities (Majone 2002), by causing a loss
of focus on the most dangerous hazards (Goldstein and Carruth 2003), and
redirecting regulatory attention from ‘known or plausible hazards to speculative
and ill-founded ones’ (Graham 2004, p. 1). Distortions to regulatory priorities
are less likely under weak formulations of the principle, which require that
potential hazards are ‘serious or irreversible’, often qualiﬁed by a requirement
for an assessment of costs.
A frequent criticism is that application of the principle will stiﬂe techno-
logical innovation and paralyse development (Goldstein and Carruth 2003;
Graham 2004; Hahn and Sunstein 2005). Weak versions of the principle are
unlikely to have this effect as they do not require precautionary measures and
there is no reversal of the burden of proof. The effect of stronger versions will
depend on how they are implemented, including, for example, the standard
of proof of safety that is required.
Supporters of the principle suggest that its application may promote develop-
ment and implementation of safer, technologically feasible, and commercially
viable alternatives that are discounted when potential hazards to the environment
or human health are ignored (EEA 2001; LaFranchi 2005). A UK Government




 it is a positive, proportionate policy tool to encourage
technological innovation and sustainable development by helping to
engender stakeholder conﬁdence that appropriate risk control measures
are in place. (ILGRA 2002, p. 4, emphasis added) 
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Some critics highlight the costs of measures taken to avoid potential, but
uncertain, risks (Cross 1996). Such criticism frequently overlooks or discounts
the potential beneﬁts from precautionary measures, such as avoiding or mini-
mising damage to human health and/or the environment. Case studies
presented by the EEA (2001) indicate substantial beneﬁts from avoiding some
hazards. Of course, due to the existence of uncertainty, some anticipated
hazards may prove to be either overestimated or unfounded (see, for example,
the case studies in Lieberman and Kwon 2004).
The European Energy Agency suggests that beneﬁts from precautionary
measures may be overlooked because ‘the costs of preventative actions are
usually tangible, clearly allocated, and often short-term, whereas the costs of
failing to act are less tangible, less clearly distributed, and usually longer
term’ (EEA 2001, p. 3). In addition, scientiﬁc uncertainty about the probability
of harm, or even about the speciﬁc nature of potential hazards, may lead to
a downgrading of the estimated beneﬁts from avoiding such hazards.
If such hazards do not eventuate, expenditures on measures to avoid the
potential hazard may be seen by some as ‘wasted’. Although this may be
true in hindsight, some forms of precautionary action (involving costs) are
akin to taking out insurance – just because the house does not burn down,
for example, does not mean that it was the wrong choice to take out home-
owner’s insurance. Even if an expected hazard does not eventuate, a decision





(i) the expected beneﬁts of precautionary measures outweighed the expected
costs; (ii) the most cost-effective and efﬁcient alternative was chosen; and
(iii) all relevant information available at the time was taken into account.
Decisions applying precaution within the context of a consideration of costs
and beneﬁts are most likely to satisfy these criteria.
A common criticism is the potential for perverse consequences. Wills, for
example, argues that, where precautionary measures are costly but ultimately
revealed to be ineffective, ‘a risk-averse society could make things worse’
(1997, p. 58). 
Goklany (2001), Cross (1996), and Lieberman and Kwon (2004) present a
large number of examples where regulations had perverse impacts. Perverse
outcomes generally result from a failure to recognise that regulatory measures
have costs, as well as beneﬁts, and may themselves give rise to risks (OIRA
2003; Hahn and Sunstein 2005). This is really a failure of the application
of the principle, rather than of the concept itself. The potential for perverse
outcomes can be reduced by thorough assessment of the costs, risks, and
consequences of the policy options as well as of the potential environmental
hazard, using the best information available at the time. Decision makers
may have to determine appropriate risk trade-offs where all of the alternatives
have associated risks.
Full assessment of potential hazards and of policy options for addressing
these hazards, although seen as desirable, has been criticised as unrealistic and
too demanding of information (Wills 1997; Goklany 2001). The precautionary 
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principle was speciﬁcally formulated to assist decision-makers in circum-
stances of limited information and scientiﬁc uncertainty. Implementation
guidelines should ideally give decision-makers guidance on how to deal with
information gaps and conﬂicting scientiﬁc opinions.
A ﬁnal common concern is that the precautionary principle is open to
misuse and opportunistic manipulation by rent-seeking commercial interests
(Treich 2001; Majone 2002; Graham 2004), and that the precautionary
principle may be used as a disguised form of protectionism. Commercial
interests, for example, may oppose a new product or process that would com-
pete effectively with existing products or processes on the grounds that it may
have unproven adverse environmental or health impacts.
The principle has been implicated in a number of international trade disputes.
For example, the EU has referred to the precautionary principle, and a
desired high level of protection, to justify import barriers to hormone-treated
beef and genetically modiﬁed food products. The USA (and other countries)
challenged the import bans on the grounds that there was no scientiﬁc evidence
of potential harm to human health from either the hormones used in beef or
from genetically modiﬁed foods.
The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures requires that precautionary measures are taken in the context of
risk assessment and identiﬁcation of potential hazards. Although the WTO
upheld the European Union’s right to determine an appropriate level of pro-
tection for its citizens, it decided in 1998 that the ban on hormone-treated
beef was in breach of the Agreement because no risk assessment had identiﬁed
plausible health risks from the hormones used to produce the beef (WTO
1998). This decision accords with the OECD view that:
Invoking precaution in situations where . . . there is no risk, or the risk
is very negligible, or where there is a perceived risk for which there is no
scientiﬁc basis, may be seen as a misuse, or abuse, of the concept. Such
abuse could lead to undesired consequences, such as imposing dispropor-
tionate costs on society and business, stiﬂing technological innovation,
or creating unjustiﬁed trade barriers. (OECD 2002, p. 8)
In summary, some of the alleged shortcomings of the precautionary principle
appear to be due to a lack of care in interpretation and application. Many
may be avoided or minimised by good implementation processes. Under
strong formulations, there may be no attempt to assess the costs, beneﬁts,
and risks of various hazards and options to prevent them. Implementation of
precautionary measures that are not justiﬁed by some weighing of potential
costs and beneﬁts may expose society to substantial costs with, in some cases,
no real beneﬁts for the environment or for human health.
Weak formulations of the principle generally avoid many of these problems.
They draw attention to the issue of uncertainty, but do not allow the mere
existence of uncertainty to justify taking any particular action. Weak versions 
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incorporate thresholds of harm to avoid taking inappropriate actions to
address trivial risks. Some weak statements of the principle require cost-
effectiveness analysis. Guidelines developed to support application of the
principle could require some form of modiﬁed cost–beneﬁt analysis to ensure
that expected beneﬁts outweigh expected costs.
Although guidelines will assist decision-makers in applying the principle, a
legal statement requiring precaution in decision-making still has a role to play.
Without a legal foundation for the application of precaution, decision-makers
may lack sufﬁcient authority and/or incentives to take precautionary decisions.
 
4. Australian application of the precautionary principle
 
The precautionary principle is already ﬁrmly established in Australian environ-
mental and natural resource management legislation. It is incorporated in a
number of international treaties and agreements that Australia is party to, as
well as a multitude of domestic policies and statutes (Dovers 2002; Peel 2005).
Precautionary principle provisions are included in Australian legislation
and policies in various ways – either directly as a legislative objective or sub-
stantive legal provision, or implicitly through reference to the principles of
ecologically sustainable development (ESD). In addition, it may be legally
relevant ‘because its widespread acceptance in the environmental policy con-
text has imbued it with general relevance for environmental decision-making’
(Gullett 2006, p. 186).
The precautionary principle is one of seven guiding principles enunciated
in the 1992 National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development
(NSESD). It is also one of four guiding principles of ESD included in the
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment (IGAE), which provides
an overarching framework for environmental and natural resource management.
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC
Act), which applies to a broad range of environmental, natural resource
management and conservation activities, requires the Minister for the Environ-
ment and Heritage to consider the precautionary principle in decision-making
(s. 391(2)).
Deﬁnitions of the precautionary principle in Australian and State legislation
and policies are generally similar, in many cases modelled on, or referring
directly to, the deﬁnition in the IGAE (Peel 2005). The IGAE states:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage,
lack of full scientiﬁc certainty should not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing measures to prevent environmental degradation. In the application
of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions should be
guided by: (i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious
or irreversible damage to the environment; and (ii) an assessment of the
risk-weighted consequences of various options. (Australian Government
1992, para. 3.5.1) 
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Most deﬁnitions refer to a risk of serious or irreversible harm. The majority
state that a lack of full scientiﬁc certainty is not a reason to postpone measures
to protect the environment, so that they do not require action.
Not all deﬁnitions include reference to measures being ‘cost-effective’
or to an ‘assessment of risk-weighted consequences’. However, decision-makers
applying deﬁnitions that do not make reference to costs or consequences,
such as the EPBC Act, may nevertheless be inﬂuenced by the NSESD and
IGAE provisions, either because they refer to these directly or because of
their overarching nature. These provisions require that economic, social, and
equity considerations are taken into account in decision-making, which could
moderate the application of the precautionary principle (Harding and Fisher
1999).
In much legislation, the precautionary principle is one of a number of factors
to be taken into account in any particular decision, such as in the formulation




Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975,
and in determining total allowable catch limits under the NSW Fisheries
Management Act 1994 (s. 30). The Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) (ss.
3–4) requires decision-makers to pursue ﬁsheries exploitation objectives in a
manner consistent with the precautionary principle simultaneously with more
traditional ﬁsheries management objectives of optimal resource utilisation and
economic efﬁciency, and compliance with international ﬁsheries laws and
agreements.
Despite broad application of the principle to environmental and natural
resource management issues, no ofﬁcial implementation guidelines have been
adopted. As Gullett concludes:
Existing legislative and policy formulations are too vague or ambiguous
to enable it [the precautionary principle] to be implemented systematically.
Its practical use is currently limited because decision-makers are not
bound to apply it and are in doubt as to how to apply it. (1997, p. 64)
The absence of implementation guidelines provides decision-makers with a
signiﬁcant degree of discretion, but also can generate extra costs for govern-
ment agencies if those adversely affected by regulatory and policy decisions
mount a legal challenge. In addition, businesses and individuals may incur
costs as a result of uncertainty about the application of precaution or incon-
sistency in administrative decision-making, for example, by applying for
approvals for which they have little chance of success.
There are a growing number of legal decisions involving the precautionary
principle. Virtually all Australian cases have involved merits review of admin-
istrative decisions by tribunals or specialist courts, which have authority to
substitute a new decision for the one under review. These tribunals and
courts reach their own conclusions about the merits or reasonableness of the
decision under review, which may involve examination of how the precau-
tionary principle has been applied in the decision-making process. 
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To date, there has been no judicial review of the legality of the precaution-
ary principle itself. Such review could potentially clarify the legal standing
and interpretation of the principle in Australia, increasing certainty for
those operating under the legislation and reducing litigation and the associ-
ated costs. Where court interpretations differ from those intended by policy-
makers, clariﬁcation of the courts’ approach would facilitate legislative
review to ensure that policy-makers’ intentions are accurately embodied in
legislation.
The most widely quoted legal case on the application of the precautionary
principle in Australia is that of 
 
Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service
 
(1993) 81 LGERA 270. In that case, Justice Stein accepted, in the NSW
Land and Environment Court, the relevance of the precautionary principle
in the context of a lack of scientiﬁc certainty about the impact of a proposed
road on an endangered frog species. Justice Stein considered the principle to
be a ‘statement of common-sense’, requiring decision-makers to adopt a
‘common-sense duty to be cautious’ where scientiﬁc uncertainty exists.
Justice Stein’s ruling discussed methods of balancing different factors in
decision-making. He emphasised that taking a precautionary approach did
not require a ‘no risk’ policy but did require consideration of alternatives
that protect the environment.
The ruling in the case overturned the decision to proceed with construc-
tion of the proposed road on the grounds that there had been insufﬁcient
consideration of less environmentally damaging alternative routes. Justice
Stein made clear his view that the precautionary principle was not simply a
means of accounting for uncertainty in isolation but required the adoption of
decision-making procedures that balanced economic cost–beneﬁt analyses,
scientiﬁc uncertainty, and social concerns (Fisher and Harding 2001). In
ﬁnding that an alternative road route had been rejected on the basis of a
cost–beneﬁt analysis that did not include environmental factors, Justice Stein
stated:
There are a number of environmental economic models which factor
environmental values into cost/beneﬁt analysis. Surely an approach which
attempts to integrate economic and environmental factors is preferable.
(
 
Leatch v National Parks & Wildlife Service
 
 (1993) 81 LGERA 270,
pp. 285–6)
While the Leatch case has been widely referred to in subsequent legal
cases, most emphasis has been placed on the ﬁnding that the precaution-
ary principle is a ‘common-sense duty to be cautious’, with much less atten-
tion given to Justice Stein’s comments about the need to balance economic,
environmental, social, and other factors (Fisher and Harding 2001). Legal
interpretations of the precautionary principle as a matter of ‘common sense’
provide little guidance to decision-makers on the procedures that should
be followed to implement the principle, how it should be weighed against 
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conﬂicting factors, or what action is required. Consequently, uncertainty remains
about what decision processes to implement in order to satisfy the courts, in
the event of legal challenge, that due regard has been given to the principle
(Gullett 2006).
In addition, there is some doubt about whether the principle is legally
binding, when no statutory directions to apply or take account of the pre-
cautionary principle are included in the legislation in question (Bates 2002).
Legislative provision for the precautionary principle, such as s. 30(2)(c) of the
NSW Fisheries Management Act 1994, would clarify for decision-makers
and those affected by their decisions when the principle is ‘a legally relevant,
and therefore an obligatory consideration, in decision-making’ (Bates 2002,
p. 132).
Balancing of the various factors involved in precautionary decision-making,
including taking into account society’s risk preferences, is appropriately a
matter for governments, rather than courts. In
 
 Greenpeace Australia Ltd v
Redbank Power Co Pty Ltd
 
 (1994) NSWLEC 178, development consent for
a power station was opposed on the grounds that it would contribute to
greenhouse emissions. In rejecting the application, the NSW Land and
Environment Court stated that ‘application of the precautionary principle
dictates that a cautious approach should be adopted in evaluating the various
relevant factors in determining whether or not to grant consent; it does not
require that the greenhouse issue should outweigh all other issues’. Evaluation
of the various factors was seen as ‘a matter of government policy’.
Some commentators have been concerned that, without clear guidelines,
decision-makers may pay only ‘lip service’ to the principle (Bates 2002,
p. 132). Others consider that almost any decision can be seen as applying a
precautionary approach (Fisher and Harding 2001). This view appears
consistent with that expressed by Justice Talbot:
. . . the precautionary principle adds nothing to the consideration that
the Court undertakes by applying common sense. (
 
Alumino (Aust) Pty
Ltd v Minister Administering the Environmental Planning & Assessment
Act 1979
 




Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc v Minister for the Environ-
ment
 
 (1997) 142 ALR 632 in the Federal Court, the Minister was considered
to have taken a cautious approach by addressing the risks to World Heritage
values identiﬁed in scientiﬁc and other reports available to him even though
the precautionary principle was not explicitly mentioned in his decision. In
many court judgements, application of the precautionary principle has
apparently added little to conventional decision-making ‘given that caution
and commonsense are generally assumed to form the basis of environmental
decision-making and review’ (Peel 2005, p. 204). However, as Gullett points
out, in ‘the absence of a uniﬁed detailed conceptualisation of the principle 
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. . . courts have had little ability to identify its legal content and have gener-
ally deferred to a department’s interpretation or application of legislation’
(2006, p. 187).
Implementation guidelines, and legislative provisions clarifying when the
principle is to be applied, could promote consistency and greater certainty in
its application. Guidelines would also provide decision-makers with techniques
for dealing effectively with uncertainty and information gaps (Peel 2005). It is
important to note, however, that some scope for administrative discretion will
remain, just as it does in decision areas not affected by signiﬁcant uncertainties.
Attempts to eliminate discretion would result in excessive prescription and
removal of the ﬂexibility needed to take into account the circumstances of
each case.
Despite the threshold of threat being ‘serious or irreversible damage to the
environment’ in the IGAE and in most Australian legislation, Gullett (2006)
identiﬁes two divergent trends in rulings on the threshold for application of
the principle in Australian case law. In several merits reviews of ﬁsheries
management decisions, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal accepted the
existence of uncertainty about the impacts of commercial ﬁshing as sufﬁcient
to trigger the threshold for applying precaution in decision-making, although
there was no evidence of a threat of serious or irreversible damage (Peel 2005;
Gullett 2006). In contrast, in merits reviews of development decisions, courts
have required credible evidence of ‘serious or irreversible damage’ in order to
satisfy the threshold of threat (Gullett 2006).
In determining what evidence of harm will satisfy the threshold, it appears
that the courts have required more rigorous evidence in small-scale planning
matters where the issues and uncertainties are seen as fairly straightforward.
In natural resource management decisions, involving more complex issues,
large information gaps, high levels of scientiﬁc uncertainty, and the potential
for serious and long-lasting damage in large ecosystems, the courts have
accepted less-objective evidence of threat as sufﬁcient to satisfy the threshold
test. Gullett concludes that ‘no clear rule can be discerned from the cases’,
with decisions being context speciﬁc (2006, p. 194).
Unpredictability creates uncertainty and costs for businesses and others
subject to precautionary decisions. As Gullett notes, although the precautionary
principle is not a ‘rigid rule’, a threshold has been expressed in Australian
legislation and ‘some legal meaning must be ascribed to it so that the principle
cannot be a complete shield for public decision makers and a blanket excuse
for arbitrary action in the inﬁnite number of environmental issues where
uncertainty exists’ (2006, p. 199). Decision makers and those affected by the
decisions would beneﬁt from access to guidelines that specify the nature and
amount of evidence required to satisfy the threshold in different contexts. For
example, evidentiary requirements may vary according to the level of uncer-
tainty (such as where credible evidence demonstrating a potential hazard is
unavailable) or the potential for large negative consequences (such as the
catastrophic outcomes of climate change predicted by some scientists). 
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Many of the shortcomings of the precautionary principle result from a failure
to place its application within a framework of good regulatory practice.
Scientiﬁc uncertainties and the potential for serious, irreversible or even cat-
astrophic harm do not exempt precautionary decision-making from normal
standards of good regulatory practice. Without a full assessment of the costs,
beneﬁts, and risks of alternatives, arbitrary invocation of the precautionary
principle risks substituting one type of damage to the environment and human
health with other unforeseen environmental and public health damage (see
section 3 and the examples given in Cross 1996; Goklany 2001; Lieberman
and Kwon 2004; PPP 2005). At the same time, substantial economic and
social costs may be incurred, potentially leaving society worse off.
Questions that remain problematic under most formulations of the principle
include (Wills 1997; Harding and Fisher 1999; Marchant and Mossman 2004;
Cooney 2005):
•H ow to treat conﬂicting or incomplete scientiﬁc information and opinion
•H ow to evaluate uncertainties and incorporate such evaluations into decision-
making
•H ow to choose ‘between different courses of action or conservation strategies
which may each pose risks, of different sorts and over different timescales’
(Cooney 2005, p. 12)
•H ow to balance competing interests and address distributional consequences
Internationally, increasing attention has been devoted in recent years to
developing guidelines to apply the precautionary principle. Little critical
attention has been given to these frameworks in Australia (Fisher and Harding
2006).
The guidelines considered below are those developed by the European
Commission (EC) in its 2000 
 
Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle
 
 (EC 2000) and the US Ofﬁce of Information and
Regulatory Affairs within the Ofﬁce of Management and Budget (OIRA
2003).
These sets of guidelines for applying precaution in regulatory decision-making
are assessed against criteria for good regulatory practice (adapted from Argy
and Johnson 2003), that is, regulations should be:
• The minimum necessary to achieve desired objectives
• Not unduly prescriptive
• Accessible, transparent and accountable
• Integrated and consistent with other regulation and international obligations
• Communicated effectively
•P r oportionate to the problem and set at a level that avoids unnecessary costs
• Enforceable 
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The focus is on identifying whether the guidelines help to ensure that
decisions (including decisions to take no action or to defer action until more
information  is available) will be efﬁcient, cost-effective, and appropriate.
Guidelines by the UK Government’s Inter-Departmental Liaison Group on
Risk Assessment (ILGRA 2002), and those recently released by the Precau-
tionary Principle Project (PPP 2005) are discussed in Peterson (2006).
The European Commission’s 2000 Communication places the precautionary
principle within the existing framework of risk analysis (EC 2000; Loefstedt
2004). The stated aim is to establish guidelines for applying the principle and
to ‘avoid unwarranted recourse to the precautionary principle, as a disguised
form of protectionism’ (EC 2000, p. 3). Decisions must be based on scientiﬁc




Scientiﬁc evidence of risk – ‘Before the precautionary principle is invoked,





Proportionality – ‘Measures based on the precautionary principle must
not be disproportionate to the desired level of protection and must not aim
at zero risk, something which rarely exists.’ (EC 2000, p. 18) Decision-makers
must consider less-restrictive alternatives that make it possible to achieve




Non-discrimination and consistency – ‘Comparable situations should not
be treated differently and different situations should not be treated in the




Examination of costs and beneﬁts – The overall costs (including noneconomic
considerations) of action and inaction must be compared. An economic




Examination of scientiﬁc developments – Precautionary measures should
be maintained as long as the scientiﬁc data are inadequate, imprecise, and
inconclusive, and as long as the risk is considered too high to be imposed




Assignment of responsibility for producing scientiﬁc evidence – While
there will often be a reversal of proof, where the proponent of an activity
must provide reasonable evidence of safety, ‘such an obligation cannot be
systematically entertained as a general principle’ (EC 2000, p. 21). In some
cases, there will be beneﬁt in research funded by the public.
The guidelines developed by the European Commission demonstrate many
features of good regulatory practice. In requiring formal assessments of costs
and beneﬁts, risk calculations, and a clear statement of the assumptions used
in decision-making, the EC guidelines should improve the transparency,
accountability, and consistency of decision-making. In addition, application
of these guidelines – by placing constraints on the way the precautionary
principle is to be incorporated into decision-making – modiﬁes the practical
effect of moderate and strong versions of the principle. The guidelines may 
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effectively ‘weaken’ more stringent statements of the principle and thereby
avoid some of the associated problems (real or perceived). The guidelines
require that the type of precautionary regulation adopted should be the least
restrictive regulation needed to achieve the desired outcome, in order to
avoid imposing unnecessary costs on society and on those directly affected.
The reversal in the evidentiary burden envisaged in the guidelines has the
potential to detract from the quality of regulatory decision-making if applied
indiscriminately. However, the guidelines state that proponents of new pro-
ducts, technologies, and processes will be required to prove that regulation is
not justiﬁed only in cases where a reversal in the burden of proof is judged to
maximise beneﬁts to society. Reversal of the evidentiary burden is not pro-
posed to apply across the board to all regulatory decisions. This limit on the
reversal of the burden of proof may reduce potential negative impacts. In
addition, the standard of proof required to be demonstrated by proponents
of an activity is important in determining the economic and social impacts of
reversing the burden of proof. While the standard of proof is not deﬁned in
the EC guidelines, the target of a high, but not zero, level of protection sug-
gests that the standard of proof adopted in each case is likely to require a
reasonable degree of certainty.
The US has also developed guidelines for the application of precaution in
regulatory decision-making. While the US Government denies the existence
of a ‘precautionary principle’ (Graham 2004), the Ofﬁce of Information and
Regulatory Affairs states:
The United States employs precautionary approaches throughout the
process of risk assessment and management so that the overall level of pre-
caution in a given regulatory decision is appropriate. (OIRA 2003, p. 54)
The US view is that precaution can only be sensibly applied within a frame-





Based on an assessment of costs and beneﬁts, and targeted towards govern-
ment objectives – ‘When Federal decision-makers decide the appropriate
level of precaution in a speciﬁc decision, they need to consider . . . factors
such as technological and economic feasibility, or more holistic beneﬁt-cost
balancing, including considerations of countervailing risks, depending on
the statutory requirements to protect the public and the environment, and




Transparent and accountable – ‘new Ofﬁce of Management and Budget
(OMB) guidelines for regulatory analysis require agencies to support
rulemakings with formal probabilistic analysis of the key scientiﬁc and




Based on scientiﬁc evidence – ‘decisions about how to respond to a potential
hazard are intended to be made after – and are informed and guided by 
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– a scientiﬁc risk assessment that is grounded in the weight of the scientiﬁc




Subject to review and ﬂexible enough to deal with new information – ‘the
ability to modify policies as scientiﬁc understanding grows is critical to the
appropriate application of precaution. The information collection, risk
assessment, and risk management phases are not static’ (OIRA 2003, p. 57).
Like the EC guidelines, the US guidelines demonstrate many of the features
of good regulatory practice. There is an emphasis on weighing the costs and
beneﬁts of regulation to the community, through formal risk assessment and
cost–beneﬁt analysis. Regulations incorporating precaution must be perform-
ance- and outcomes-focused, transparent, and accountable, and targeted at
achieving statutory objectives. They are open to review and modiﬁcation
when new scientiﬁc information becomes available.
Although the US guidelines do not speciﬁcally mention a reversal in the
burden of proof, some US regulations impose a requirement on proponents
of new products, technologies, or processes to prove why approval to market
or use the product, technology or process should be granted. For example,
requirements for premarket approval prevent the sale or use of certain pro-
ducts, such as food additives, medicines, medical devices, and pesticides,
unless they are proven to meet speciﬁed safety requirements. Mandatory
operating permits prevent the operation of hazardous waste facilities, nuclear
power plants, ﬁshing activities, trade in endangered species, and other busi-
ness activities without some prior demonstration of safety or the absence of
signiﬁcant environmental damage (CEC 2003; Vogel 2003). The standard of
proof adopted is generally ‘reasonable certainty’.
There appear to be signiﬁcant areas of agreement between the US and EC
guidelines for implementing the precautionary principle. Some commentators
have argued that the USA and Europe are converging in their approaches to
applying precaution (Wiener 2003; Christoforou 2004; Loefstedt 2004). Dif-
ferences remain in the weight placed upon formal scientiﬁc and quantitative
assessments compared to more qualitative risk assessments, the treatment of
uncertainty, and the types of risks considered most serious (Vogel 2003;




A common misconception is that the precautionary principle requires action
or a certain type of action. In fact, internationally accepted deﬁnitions
(‘weak’ or less restrictive formulations) are about decision-making processes
– they neither prescribe action nor any particular action. This paper argues
that less restrictive formulations of the precautionary principle are generally
to be preferred to stronger versions. Weak formulations can serve as a useful
reminder to decision-makers that inaction is not necessarily the optimal
response to uncertainty. They provide greater guidance to decision-makers on 
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thresholds for action. In addition, deﬁnitions incorporating ‘cost-effectiveness’
or ‘assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various actions’ provide
a legal backing, as well as explicit incentives, for decision-makers to take into
consideration the costs, beneﬁts, and risks of alternative responses to uncertain
hazards. Weak versions thus provide greater legal support for the application
of implementation guidelines advocated in this paper. Most ofﬁcial versions,
including Australian government statements of the principle, fall into the
weak category.
The precautionary principle is, and will remain, challenging to apply. Decision-
makers must make judgements or assumptions about the range of possible
outcomes, the effectiveness of various options to address the problem, and
the assumed probabilities attached to the range of outcomes. Subjective
judgements of this nature are unavoidable when there is genuine uncertainty.
Decisions will also need to be made about what level of risk society is prepared
to accept in various contexts.
Although applying precaution will always involve some degree of subjectiv-
ity, the development of clear guidelines for applying the precautionary prin-
ciple nevertheless has major beneﬁts. Placing the principle within the context
of good regulatory practice helps to ensure that decision-making is transparent,
consistent, and accountable; that it uses all relevant information; that costs,
beneﬁts, and risks are identiﬁed, assessed, and compared; and that measures
are targeted at, and proportionate to, the problem. This decision-making
framework will help avoid many problems potentially arising from application
of the principle, including the risk of perverse outcomes, over-reaction to
trivial risks, and misuse as a rent-seeking (or protectionist) measure.
Without guidelines, Australian applications of the principle may suffer from
a lack of clarity about implementation procedures, leading to inconsistencies,
uncertainties, and legal challenge to environmental and natural resource
management decisions. A challenge for agricultural and resource economists
is to contribute to the development of guidelines for precautionary decision-
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